The United States has imposed sanctions on nearly two dozen companies and individuals accused of running a vast international network that smuggles Iranian oil to fund Iran’s military operations and terrorist groups.
According to the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Iranian government allocates billions of dollars’ worth of oil every year to its armed forces outside the official defense budget. This funding supports the development of ballistic missiles, drones, and the financing of terrorist organisations.
Since the current U.S. administration took office, OFAC has carried out 19 actions targeting Tehran and its affiliates, sanctioning a total of 253 individuals, companies, and vessels.
One of the main targets of the sanctions is Sepehr Energy, which is commercially tied to Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). OFAC had already sanctioned Sepehr Energy in November 2023 for providing material and financial support to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL itself had been designated in 2019 for supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force.
Sepehr Energy allegedly hides the origin of Iranian oil by using a network of front companies. These companies create the appearance of legal oil transactions between different entities, when in reality, they are all part of Sepehr’s oil smuggling and money laundering network.
Three Hong Kong-based companies, Xin Rui Ji Trad Co., Limited, Star Energy International Limited, and Milen Trading Co., Limited, are said to be controlled by Sepehr Energy. They act as intermediaries, delivering Iranian oil to so-called “teapot” refineries in China.
These companies are run by Sepehr Energy officials, including Elyas Nirumand Toomaj, who is already under sanctions. Star Energy alone moved tens of millions of dollars on behalf of Sepehr Energy.
Between mid-2023 and mid-2024, another Sepehr front company, Puyuan Trade Co., Limited, delivered multiple Iranian oil shipments to Xin Rui Ji at Qingdao Port in Shandong Province, China. Puyuan also leased storage tanks in Dongjiakou to hold the oil before it reached buyers. Similarly, oil was delivered via Star Energy and Milen Trading through Rizhao Port.
Once the oil is sold, the profits go from these front companies back to Iran’s AFGS. Iranian national Mohammad Khorasani Niasari, a financial inspector for Sepehr Energy, is accused of managing these transactions along with Toomaj. OFAC has now designated Khorasani for acting on behalf of Sepehr Energy.
Before reaching China, Iranian oil is disguised through ship-to-ship transfers, blending with other oils, and document falsification. Sepehr Energy reportedly used CCIC Singapore PTE. Ltd. to inspect cargo and cover up the true origin of the oil.
In late 2024, CCIC Singapore inspected two million barrels of Iranian oil transferred from the sanctioned vessel SIRI (IMO 9281683), formerly ANTHEA. The company also inspected the HECATE (IMO 9233753) in mid-2024, allegedly issuing false documents identifying the Iranian oil as Malaysian crude.
Another company, Huangdao Inspection and Certification Co., Ltd, a sister firm based in China, also provided inspection services for multiple sanctioned vessels during the same period. Both companies are now sanctioned for materially supporting Sepehr Energy.
Once the oil reaches Chinese ports, Sepehr Energy depends on local firms to handle ship berthing, unloading, and transport of the cargo. Many of these operations occur in Shandong province, home to small, independent “teapot” refineries that frequently purchase Iranian crude.
One such company, Qingdao Linkrich International Shipping Agency Co., Ltd, served as Sepehr’s designated port agent. It assisted Sepehr Energy vessels at Qingdao Port and helped Xin Rui Ji deliver oil to Yantai Port. It also handled berthing and discharge for a shipment delivered by the HECATE in mid-2024. Qingdao Linkrich has now been sanctioned for materially supporting Sepehr Energy.
Several small Hong Kong and Singapore-based companies acted as intermediaries between Sepehr and the teapot refineries, including Metaone Trading Limited, South Sea Energy Limited, Continental Sinoil Group Limited, Winso Trading Limited, and Oriental Apple Company PTE Ltd. These firms accepted delivery of millions of barrels of oil from Xin Rui Ji in early 2024.
Another Chinese firm, Qingdao Fushen Petrochemical Co., Ltd, bought over $138 million worth of oil from Sepehr Fronts Star Energy and Xin Rui Ji. These transactions involved direct communication with Sepehr officials based in Dubai.
All these companies have now been sanctioned for supporting Sepehr Energy’s oil trade.
The Iranian military and Sepehr Energy are still using older tankers known as the “shadow fleet” to move oil across borders. As of early 2025, Sepehr Energy’s official Toomaj was using the Cameroon-flagged BALU and the Panama-flagged ROC to transport oil to China.
The companies owning these vessels, Forsal Chartering Corporation in Seychelles and Fine Sanmata Shipping Co., Limited in Hong Kong, have also been sanctioned. Additionally, maritime logistics company Nanhai Limited, based in Hong Kong, is said to have supported these tanker operations and is now under sanctions.
The BALU and ROC have been identified as blocked property tied to their respective owners.
Reference: US Treasury
Source: Maritime Shipping News